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the political activity o f members of the medical professionand relations between the profession, governments, and other political actors-have been characterized by regular and escalating conflict since the beginnings o f universal government health insurance in the 1960s. Such conflict has focused on the medical profession's defense o f its corporate autonomy in the face of what it has viewed as unwarranted government intrusion in medical affairs. At issue have been the profession's claims of dominance and control of the health care delivery system as opposed to government's desire to guarantee as a social right reasonable access to health care for all Canadians.
In this article medical politics in Canada in the aftermath o f the Canada Health Act o f 1984 (Government of Canada 1984) is examined. Intended by the federal government as a means of counteracting a perceived erosion o f public access to medical care due to the willingness of some provinces to allow charges to patients for physician and hospital services over and above those insured under the federalprovincial health insurance program (Medicare), the act served as a lightning rod for profession-government conflict, and touched off a doctors' strike in Canada's largest province, Ontario, lasting 25 days.
In this article data from a 1987 representative national survey of
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Canadian physicians is used to investigate the most recent cycle of conflict between physicians and government over control of the health care system. The contours of professional response to a range of issues at the center of the political debate over the Canada Health Act are documented, and the implications for the future course of medical politics in Canada are assessed. W e argue that the profession's response must be understood (1) in terms of the ideological commitments and solidarity of members of the profession who are in opposition to Medicare; (2) by variations in the manner in which provincial health insurance programs are administered, and, particularly, in the extent to which such programs are perceived by physicians to intrude upon areas o f professional interest; and (3) by the internal dynamics of leadership and participation in the organized medical associations that play a major role in articulating the political interests of the medical profession.
The first section of the article provides an introduction to the historical development of the federal-provincial health insurance system in Canada and to the political issues and conflicts accompanying it. The second section gives details of the 1987 physicians' survey from which the data used in this article are derived, and specifies hypotheses guiding the empirical analysis. The third section presents the responses of physicians in all Canadian provinces to questions concerning the operations and financing o f Medicare, and strategies open to the profession in pursuing its political goals. In a fourth section we focus on the recent physicians' strike in Ontario, investigating the extent to which physician involvement in this most extreme manifestation o f conflict over Canadian Medicare confirms our hypotheses about the ways in which professional response is grounded in ideology and professional organization. Finally, in section five we present our con clusions about the nature o f medical politics in Canada and about their implications for the future development of Canadian Medicare.
Historical Development
After government health insurance was forced onto the political agenda by the massive social and economic dislocation of the Depression, the Canadian Medical Association, articulating the collective national interest of physicians, insisted in 1934 that any such program be administered so as to guarantee the dominance and autonomy of the profession within the health care delivery system. Such dominance and autonomy was justified in the association's view, not simply by the self-interests of physicians, but by the congruence of professional and public interests, " because what is best for the medical profession must be best for the public" (Taylor 1978, 24) . This insistence reflected the profession's belief that physicians, due to their mastery of a complex diagnostic and curative technology, were best able to make decisions concerning the health of Canadians, including those in the political sphere (Naylor 1986, 245; Taylor I9 6 0 , 125) .
When draft federal legislation for a national health insurance program was presented in 1943, it essentially accommodated the profession's key demands. This included a guarantee of professional representation on commissions adm inistering public health insurance, remuneration for the provision o f medical services by methods selected by the profession, complete control by the organized profession in each province of fee schedules, and a guarantee that no economic barrier would be imposed between doctor and patient. Under these circumstances the Canadian Medical Association (CMA) (1943, 31) endorsed the principle of government health insurance, stating its readiness " to render any assistance" toward " the solution of one of the country's most important problem s." The proposed legislation foundered, however, as a result of federal-provincial disagreements over postwar financial arrangements, and in 1949 the CM A backtracked from its earlier position. It now declared that government involvement in health insurance should be restricted to paying into voluntary private insurance plans part or all of the premium o f those unable to pay (Taylor 1978, 108) .
This reiteration of the profession's historical opposition to governmentcontrolled health insurance reflected two developments. First, in the vacuum created by the collapse o f the federal initiative, the profession had moved to establish its own physician-controlled health insurance plans. By 1949 seven such plans existed offering coverage to Canadians in all regions of the country (Taylor, Stevenson, and W illiams 1984, 3; Shillington 1972, 4 0 -45) . Second, in 1947 the social-democratic. Co-operative Commonwealth Federation government of Saskatchewan, one o f the sm allest and poorest o f the Canadian provinces, and one especially hard hit by the Depression, introduced its own program of compulsory hospital insurance. Sim ilar initiatives in other provinces followed, as well as a federal program of conditional grants for hospital construction, disease control, and medical research (W eller and Manga 1983, 227) . If these developments quickened the pace o f evolution toward a national health insurance system in Canada, they also clarified the essential point of political conflict in that evolution-the question of public or private control.
Nevertheless, overt political conflict over the federal government's H ospital Insurance and Diagnostic Services Act o f 1957 was minimized by the fact that this legislation subsidized the institutional facilities in which the most costly o f physicians' services were provided, without affecting the greater range o f medical services provided through private offices. Professional opposition escalated rapidly, however, when the success o f hospital insurance and the proliferation o f the professioncontrolled plans stimulated further government initiatives to provide more comprehensive and universal medical care insurance (Taylor 1978, 170-75) .
In 1962 the social-democratic government of Saskatchewan extended its health insurance program to cover the costs of virtually all physicians' services, whether or not they were provided in an institutional setting. This action was met by a month-long strike in which physicians in the province withdrew all but emergency services. The outcome was a compromise which, on the one hand, acknowledged the right of government to introduce and operate a public health insurance program, but which, on the other, permitted physicians to practice outside of the program and to " extra bill'' patients at more than governmentinsured rates (Badgley and Wolfe 1967, 70) .
Although this compromise between public and private control was reproduced on a national scale through the subsequent federal Medical Gire Insurance Act of 1966 which led to the establishment of government health insurance programs in all ten provinces, the new national initiative was strenuously opposed by professional association spokesmen appearing before the Royal Commission and parliamentary committees involved (Taylor 1978, chap. 6) . Direct physician obstruction of the national program was checked, however, by the continued dominance and autonomy o f the profession as a result o f the entrenchment of the fee-for-service payment system and the retention o f fee schedules previously established by medical associations for the physician-sponsored insurance plans. Physician compliance was further assured by the windfall professional income gains realized in the early years o f Medicare's operation resulting from the fact that physicians were now virtually guaranteed payment for every service provided (Coburn, Torrance, and Kaufert 1983, table 2. Naylor, 1986: 248) .
Even if physicians, at least initially, fared well economically under government health insurance, there was an inevitable tension between a profession jealous o f its corporate autonomy and governments jealous of their treasuries, especially in times of fiscal crisis (Touhy 1976, 192-94) . In spite o f the entrenchment of fee-for-service payment, governments proved unwilling to serve simply as disbursement agencies (Soderstom 1980, 225-26) . Their attem pts to impose some constraint upon escalating health care costs intensified professional opposition to Medicare, leading to the 1970 strike of Quebec specialists, and, after 1970, to the increasing resort by individual physicians to extra billing above insured fee schedules.
Pressures for controlling health costs increased in the m id-1970s. Federal wage and price controls introduced in 1975, and the abandonment of plans for review and expansion of the social welfare system, marked a national shift away from the tenets of Keynesianism to fiscal restraint and monetarist policies. Assisted by the provincial governments' interest in restoring their own initiative in the health policy field, the 1977 Federal-Provincial Fiscal Arrangements and Established Programs Fi nancing Act fixed the federal share of health program costs to the rate of growth o f the gross national product. W hile providing a framework for greater provincial flexibility and efficiency in the man agement o f health insurance plans, the legislation effectively capped federal contributions to health care and created conditions for the progressive Balkanization and privatization o f the Canadian health care system (W eller and M anga 1983, 233-35) .
Faced by the twin facts o f escalating health care costs, and limited revenues, Medicare premiums were increased in three provinces that required them. In addition, some provinces permitted direct user charges for hospital services, and others tacitly approved the practice of extra billing by physicians. These developments increased the costs to individuals o f medical services and prompted widespread public concern that the principle o f access seen to underly Medicare was being threatened (W eller and M anga 1983, 239) . Such concern led to the establishment o f a federal Royal Commission of inquiry in 1979 that reaffirmed the principle o f access, and in 1984 to the introduction by the federal government of the Canada Health Act that levied financial penalties upon provinces perm itting user fees and extra billing.
This move against extra billing was viewed by the medical profession as a direct assault on its autonomy despite the fact that the practice had already been banned in two provinces-Quebec and British Co lumbia-prior to 1984, was of little or no consequence in two other provinces-Newfoundland and Prince Edward Island-and was ended by government-profession agreement at or about the time of the act in three additional provinces-Nova Scotia, Manitoba, and Saskatchewan (Heiber and Deber 1987) . In the face o f survey evidence showing that the great majority of Canadians opposed extra billing and that public support for Medicare was overwhelming (Heiber and Deber 1987, 66) physicians and their professional organizations condemned the act as an unwarranted intrusion on professional freedom that reduced the profession to public service. The Canadian Medical Association criticized the legislation as turning doctors into "a type of state employee," with a " loss o f professional independence," arguing that the benefits realized under a medical system " manned (sic) by volunteers" would not result from a system " manned by demoralized conscripts" (Geekie 1984; Montgomery 1984) .
The high-water mark o f conflict was the Ontario doctors' strike of 1986. A history of relatively nonconflictual relations between government and the medical profession in Canada's largest and wealthiest province was altered a year earlier by the eleaion of a Liberal minority government supported in power by the social-democratic New Democratic Party (N D P) which demanded the end of extra billing. Pressured by the federal financial penalties of the Canada Health Act, by public concern over a perceived erosion o f access, and by the need to maintain NDP support, the province introduced legislation forcing physicians to accept fees insured under Medicare as full payment for their services.
In this action the provincial government faced the Ontario Medical Association (OM A), the most powerful o f the professional associations in Canada, representing a constituency in which fee-for-service, solo practioners were proportionately more numerous than in any other province (Williams, Stevenson, and Vayda 1987) . The OMA responded initially by calling for a two-day strike (May 29-30) supported by an estimated 60 to 75 percent o f doctors in the province (Toronto Globe and Mail, May 30: Al) . When this show of muscle had no effect, the O M A Council, in an " almost unanimous*' decision, called for an unlimited strike to begin on Ju n e 12, asking doctors to provide only emergency services and cancel elective surgery, and asking all hospital chiefs-of-staff and -services to resign (Silversides and McMonagle 1986 ).
The Ontario strike lasted 25 days, just longer than the Saskatchewan strike a quarter century earlier. As in that earlier instance, the strike failed in its fundamental political objective-the obstruction of gov ernment's resolve to extend its control over health insurance. In one sense, therefore, the Ontario strike suggests a political naivete, weakness, or inability to learn from experience on the part of the profession. On the other hand, the strike mobilized a large proportion of the profession in opposition to government and may have stimulated a substantial measure o f political solidarity even among those who did not strike. Such strengths, real or imagined, may limit future elaboration of government health insurance in ways opposed by the profession.
It is in this latter connection that the Canadian literature has tended simply to assume that the medical profession is monolithically committed to the defense o f its professional autonomy and dominance in the health care system, that it maintains a substantial power if not absolute veto over the formulation o f health policy, and that the scope of future reforms is, therefore, severely lim ited. In the view of expert observers, "physicians collectively carry more political weight than any other group in health care. Their access to the headlines, and their degree of organization and com m itm ent, assures that their concerns will remain at or near the top o f the public policy agenda'' (Barer, Evans, and Labelle 1988) .
Although not directly challenging these conclusions, our aim is to qualify them by suggesting that " the degree of organization and commitment" o f the medical profession is less than is commonly assumed, and that the political weight of the profession is greater than it need be because governments and other political actors hold exaggerated assumptions about its organization and commitment. In developing this argum ent, we touch on three general aspects of medical politics in Canada. Two o f them, already referred to as organization and com m itm ent, concern the ideological commitments and solidarity of members o f the profession and the internal dynamics of leadership and participation in the medical associations that articulate its collective political interests. A third aspect of medical politics, also touched upon, has to do with the activities of governments in the administration of the health care system, and relations between governments and professional organizations.
Data and Hypotheses
Our national survey of Canadian physicians was conducted between November 1986 and May 1987 at the Institute for Social Research, York University. The survey was designed as a follow-up to an earlier one conducted in 1982 prior to the introduction of the Canada Health Act (Taylor, Stevenson, Williams 1984) . Self-administered questionnaires were mailed to all 2,100 respondents to the 1982 survey, and to another 2 ,0 0 0 physicians randomly selected to ensure the national representativeness of the new sample. Initial mail contacts were followed by a series of reminder cards, letters, and additional questionnaires, and, finally, by personal telephone calls to nonrespondents, producing a total of 2,397 completions. After adjustment for ineligible respondents (physicians no longer in medical practice) and "dead addresses" (physicians deceased, moved out o f the country, or otherwise not reachable by phone or mail), this number represented an effective response rate of 67 percent.
The central objective o f the survey was to document professional attitudes and behavior following the Canada Health Act. The survey, therefore, included questions which asked physicians about (a) different aspects of Canadian Medicare in principle and practice; (b) various existing and proposed policies regarding physicians' incomes and the financing o f health services; and (c) political strategies open to the profession in responding to government policies perceived to impinge upon professional autonomy. Our analysis o f professional ideology, organization, and government-profession relations is based upon physician response in these areas. Our operational hypotheses are as follows.
Ideological Conflict
We are concerned, first, with the extent to which the medical profession is ideologically monolithic in its defense o f professional dominance and autonomy, and, by extension, in its opposition to the banning by provincial governments of extra billing following the Canada Health Act. W e have argued elsewhere (Stevenson and W illiam s 1985) that physicians' attitudes toward health policy issues are ideologically struc tured, that they tend to be systematically organized in terms of the intensity o f support for the principles o f professional dominance and autonomy rather than objective differences in professional background and experience. In this article, we want to modify that argument, indicating a more complex organization o f physicians' attitudes. Rather than focusing on a single dimension o f ideology, with contrasting positions for and against Medicare, we hypothesize that there are three relatively distinct ideological positions taken by physicians.
First, there is a small but significant group of physicians who systematically support government health insurance in principle and in practice, accepting public regulation and financing of health as a means o f guaranteeing equitable access as a social right for all citizens. Second, there is a larger and more influential group in systematic opposition to government health insurance. These physicians ground their opposition in an ideological criticism of social welfare " rights," and of government interventions in social and economic life securing these rights, favoring rather the principles o f laissez-faire liberalism and a return to free-market medicine.
Between these polar positions lies a middle ground occupied by the majority. As in the wider political universe, so in the medical profession this m iddle ground is defined by a mixed appropriation of the ideas articulated on the left and right. In the case of medical ideology, the essential logic o f the mix involves opposition to government control of the health care system and confirmation of medical dominance, but support for state licensing o f the monopolistic powers of the profession and public financing o f its activities.
For physicians occupying the middle ground, therefore, the ideological justification o f professional dominance does not stem from a principled opposition to state intervention in free markets as such, but from a desire to ensure that such intervention serves medicine's interests. W ithout resort to ideological principles other than self-interest, this majority position may be less coherent and unified than conventional interpretations o f the solidarity o f the medical profession would suggest, subject to the com peting appeals o f the ideologically more consistenr positions to the right and left. On the other hand, physicians in this middle category may articulate an equally coherent but more pragmatic conception o f medical dominance, recognizing that "only in rhetoric is there a conflict between state control and private organization of medical practice; in reality 'private versus public' debates are over who shall direct the power o f the state in regulating the health care market" (Evans 1984, 69) .
Internal Dynamics o f Professional Organizations
We are interested, secondly, in the ways in which professional associations mobilize opposition to Medicare. In this connection we will examine differences in the policy attitudes of medical association leaders, activist members, nonactive members, and nonmembers. There are three hy pothetical scenarios that m ight describe the internal politics of the medical profession. First, the extent of solidarity within the profession over the issues raised by government initiatives in health policy during the 1980s may be such that there is no significant division between medical association leaders and the rank and file in the profession. Alternatively, the " logic of collective action" may force professional association leaders to engage in ideological mobilization of a membership otherwise loosely involved in medical politics. Medical association executives may therefore " lead" their memberships in opposition to legislation like the Canada Health Act, and we may expect a greater degree of opposition to recent changes in Medicare on the part of leaders as compared to the rank and file. Finally, as opposed to this latter top-down mobilization, a minority of activist members who are more rigid ideologues of professional autonomy may "push" their associations, rather than being led by them. The supposition in this case is that relatively moderate political stances on the part of medical association executives could stem from a greater awareness of the practical need to engage in conciliation and bargaining with government. If this scenario is the most accurate o f the three, a different style of medical politics could be anticipated if the professional associations can be captured by the "quiet majorities" rather than by the militant minorities among their members.
Public Adm inistration
We are concerned, finally, with the general question o f the extent to which differences in the operations of provincial health insurance programs influence the political attitudes of physicians. Differences in provincial government, policy priorities, and political culture may have critical m ediating effects upon the professional response to gov ernment health insurance.
In Quebec, where there has been a more pronounced historical commitment to social welfere expansion and a more collectivist political culture, we m ight expect less professional opposition to Medicare in principle. In the M aritime provinces, where conditions of regional economic underdevelopment have increased the need for welfare state programs, and where such programs have been more strongly supported in public opinion, we expect a similarly more approving professional opinion on Medicare. Greater delegated authority to the profession in the administration of provincial health plans, as in Nova Scotia, may also encourage greater professional support for Medicare. Conversely, in the Western provinces where there have been, in varying degrees, strong attacks on the welfare state, we expect greater ideological commitment by physicians to their professional autonomy against perceived intrusions by government.
We might also expect a priori that professional opposition to Medicare will be greater with greater conflict between government and professional associations. In a number o f cases, this effect and the political culture effect discussed in the last paragraph run in opposite directions. In Quebec, for example, where we expect the highest support for Medicare as a result o f the influence o f the wider political environment, income negotiations between the province and profession have been conflictual and physicians may be less rather than more supportive o f Medicare as a result o f their experience o f the lowest rate of increase in incomes. In Alberta, to take the opposite interaction, ideological hostility to Medicare, reflecting the local political culture, may be tempered by a history o f nonconflictual relations between the provincial medical association and government, and by a record of much better than average income settlements. It may also be the case that direct professiongovernment confrontation over questions of medical autonomy could lead to a recognition within the profession o f the limitations of its position vis-a-vis the entrenched political support for Medicare. Militant action by professional associations has to date not been particularly effective in securing the political objectives of physician or in advancing the political influence o f medical associations. Accordingly, physicians in Saskatchewan, M anitoba, and Ontario, to take the cases of the greatest recent conflict between government and associations, may be more rather than less disposed to accept recent changes in health policy.
Findings
Medicare in Principle an d in Practice. The 1982 survey found that Canadian physicians were more critical of the principle of government involvement in health insurance than of the actual operation and effects of their provincial programs (Taylor, Stevenson, and W illiams 1984) . The 1986 data confirm this general finding and reaffirm the extent of ideologically based criticism among physicians of government s presence in the health care field.
Alm ost 50 percent of physicians agree-but 31 percent disagreethat " Medicare has resulted in a direct loss of physician control over medical decisions*' (table 1). While there are grounds to argue that by institutionalizing fee-for-service medicine, Canadian Medicare has reinforced rather than undermined critical aspects of economic and clinical autonomy, a plurality of physicians feel that government health insurance constrains their professional practice. They justify this primarily by the charge that the Canadian health care system is " underfunded," and that as a result equipment and facilities necessary for the full exercise of professional competence are not readily available. Note, however, that a recent special inquiry commissioned by the Canadian Medical Association (1986, ) was unable to substantiate this charge.
Three-quarters (74 percent) of physicians believe that Medicare has reduced " the individuals personal sense of responsibility for health" (table 1) . This reflects a common concern o f the profession that free access to medical care leads to an increase in the volume of trivial demands for service and overutilization. As a result physicians believe that their capacity to provide necessary care is undermined (Canadian Medical Association 1986, 105) .
The next two items in table 1 concern the consequences of public and bureaucratic administration o f the health care system. Despite the fact that administrative costs as a percentage o f total health care costs are an estimated four to eight times greater in the private medical marketplace o f the United State than they are in Canada (Himmelstein and Woolhandler 1986; W eller 1986, 612) , one-half of the physicians surveyed disagree-and only 19 percent agree-that "compared to rP PI x r 00 00 pi x r pi pi d pi pi Cl. private health insurance program s, under Medicare a lower percentage of the health care dollar is allocated to administrative overhead." Nevertheless, 44 percent agree that ''centralized planning of health care is necessary" to ensure that resources are optimally distributed. While arguing that government administration of health care is undesirable, there is, therefore, less opposition to the principle of centralized, bureaucratic administration. Given the extent of physicians' antipathy toward government, it is significant that almost 61 percent agree-and only 19 percent disagree-that Medicare ''has positively influenced the health status of Canadians" by improving access to medical services. Improved access was a central objective o f Canadian Medicare (Taylor 1978) which, the majority o f physicians acknowledge, has been met. The question for the profession, however, is to what extent this objective could have been met without government involvement, through the physiciansponsored plans that predated Medicare. Comments appended by phy sicians to their questionnaires restate the profession's historical position that the role o f government should have been limited to financing the private health insurance premiums of those who could not otherwise afford them.
Ju st over 60 percent o f physicians are satisfied ''in the practice of medicine" under Medicare and only 24 percent are dissatisfied. While a positive endorsement o f government health insurance in practice, this is a lim ited endorsement since about equal thirds of respondents rate provincial medical and hospital care programs as ''excellent," ''good ," and ''p oor." Further, about two-thirds of physicians believe that the quality o f care under provincial programs has either failed to improve or has actually deteriorated over the past decade, and only 26 percent believe it has gotten better. These results suggest that physicians make a distinction between their own practices and the medical care system as a whole, deriving satisfaction from the former, but remaining unconvinced of the values and effects of the latter.
Provincial breakdowns in table 1 show that Nova Scotia physicians are less critical o f Medicare than their colleagues in other provinces. While almost one-half o f all physicians surveyed agree that Medicare reduces physician control over medical decisions, 4 l percent of those in Nova Scotia do so, and an equal number explicitly disagree. Similarly, greater than average proportions o f physicians in Nova Scotia agree that administrative costs are lower under Medicare, that centralized planning is necessary, and that Medicare has positively influenced health status. Nova Scotia physicians are also more likely to assess the provincial program as very good to excellent, to state that they are satisfied in practice, and that the quality o f care in their province has improved. A more qualified recommendation is given by Quebec physicians. Although they are less likely to agree that Medicare has undercut medical decisions or decreased personal responsibility for health, most feel that the quality of care has deteriorated.
Physicians in western provinces are more critical of Medicare. In Saskatchewan, 59 percent feel that the program undermines physician control over medical decisions, and 85 percent believe it reduces personal responsibility for health. In Manitoba, 55 percent rate the provincial program as " poor,'' and 28 percent say they are "dissatisfied'' in practice. In Alberta, 56 percent o f physicians disagree that ad ministrative costs are lower under Medicare.
These breakdowns initially appear to confirm the hypothesis that differences in medical ideology correspond to differences in provincial political cultures. Physician opposition to Medicare in provinces such as Nova Scotia may be muted because control over health policy is, or is perceived to be, more in the hands of the profession (Heiber and Deber 1987) . On the other hand, the relatively mild criticism of Medicare in Ontario, where provincial legislation to end extra billing precipitated the closing of doctors' offices and hospital emergency wards in 1986, clearly modifies the hypothesis of greater physician opposition to Medicare, the greater the conflict between government and medical association.
When responses are examined by medical association membership status it appears that professional association leaders may be responding to the pressure o f m ilitant activists. The survey asked, " Which of the following best characterizes your current involvement in the medical association in your province? Are you . a member of the executive, committees, or district councils . . an active member who attends meetings, votes in elections, and so on . . . a member but not otherwise active . . . a nonmember" ? W hile the date show that greater proportions of association executives as compared to nominal members and association nonmembers, state negative evaluations of Medicare, active members are somewhat more likely than the executives to do so. For example, 58 percent o f active members but only 52 percent of executives agree that Medicare has undermined physicians' control over medical decisions. Sim ilar differences are found in responses to the other items in table 1.
Income an d Financial Arrangements. The confrontation over the Canada Health Act centers on the prohibition o f extra billing and user fees, and on related problems of the private or patient financing of health services. The source of professional concern in this area is shown in the first line of table 2. Three-quarters of medical practitioners believe that compared to other occupational groups, they are " losing ground" economically. This concern reflects the fact that in 1959 physicians* incomes were 3.7 times the average national industrial wage in Canada, a ratio which increased to 4 .9 in 1970, peaked at 5.4 in 1971 after the entry of Quebec into medicare, but declined by 1978 to 3.4 (Naylor 1986, 248 ; cf. the similar index of "physicians" relative incomes" in Evans 1984, 14-15) . Instead of acknowledging the initial economic gains due to the introduction of Medicare, physicians focus instead on the relative decline after 1971.
In this context, extra billing-the practice of charging fees for service in excess of those covered under provincial health insurance programs-has been viewed by the profession as a way of allowing individual physicians to increase their incomes while avoiding the most serious threats to professional autonomy posed by " a single paymaster." Again, extra billing was a concession won by Saskatchewan physicians in their 1962 strike. The practice continues to be regarded by the profession as a principal way of maintaining medical autonomy in the face of increasing government control. Extra billing also serves as a reference point for the " market value" of physicians' services in fee schedule negotiations between government and professional associations.
A majority o f physicians surveyed (52 percent) favor reestablishing extra billing. It is significant, however, that 29 percent explicitly oppose this practice. Together with the over 19 percent who are neutral, this suggests that despite the official militancy of opposition, the Canada Health Act stim ulated real opposition among only a bare majority o f physicians.
In addition to arguing for extra billing on the grounds of threats to medical autonomy, and of the chronic " underfunding" of the health care system, spokesmen for the profession have also argued for a greater degree o f " reprivatization." This includes policy changes which would assess costs directly to the consumers of medical services, increase As W eller points out, " if reprivatization were to take place and extra billing and user fees were allowed then (government's) monopoly would be partially broken and there would be extra money in the system to allow for increased incomes" (W eller 1986, 613) . The data in table 2 show widespread support among Canadian physicians for these arguments. Sixty-two percent o f the survey respondents approve o f "establishing or increasing user fees for hospital services," while 27 percent disapprove and 11 percent are neutral. On another proposal for greater private funding of the health care system, about 46 percent of physicians approve of "annual family deductibles of $200.00 for provincial Medicare program s," while 30 percent are neutral, and 24 percent disapprove. Almost 60 percent o f physicians approve and only 25 percent disapprove o f the proposal " to allow private insurance carriers to cover services now covered by Medicare." This finding is consistent with the profession's historical stance in favor of a private health insurance system financed in part by government-paid premiums. Even if not physician-controlled, a private system involving multiple carriers would reduce the perceived threat to incomes connected with a "single paymaster" and relatively increase the profession's bargaining power.
Responses to the last three items in table 2, however, suggest that there are important lim its to Canadian physicians' ideological support for an unregulated medical marketplace. Presumably because it implies the reduction o f physician control over institutional care, a majority o f physicians do not support the idea o f " hospital management by private, for-profit management firms" ; only 40 percent approve, while an equal percentage disapprove. Further, 52 percent of respondents disapprove of the proposal that "the Medicare system should be returned to voluntary and commercial control," and an even greater proportion (54 percent) disagree with the statement that " market forces alone should determine the mix and distribution o f health care services and facilities." Although reduced government control is desired by physicians, only one-quarter o f them desire full-blown competition in a private market. At the very least this constitutes an indirect acknowledgment by physicians o f their advantages under Medicare (including guaranteed payment for virtually every service performed). This is also consistent with the view that medical dominance o f Medicare, and not a return to the free market, is the preferred position o f the Canadian profession (Coburn, Torrance, and Kaufert 1983; Hamowy 1985; Naylor 1986 ).
Provincial differences in response to these items may be briefly summarized. Relatively large numbers o f physicians in Saskatchewan (62 percent), Alberta (57 percent), and British Colum bia (55 percent) approve of the establishment of annual family deductibles for provincial health insurance program s. Alberta physicians also give strong support of for-profit hospital management, voluntary and commercial control of medical insurance, and coinsurance o f medical services. Quebec physicians, though relatively more likely than those in other provinces to complain about " losing ground economically,*' are much less likely to endorse user fees, coinsurance, or family deductibles. Finally, phy sicians practising in the Atlantic provinces are less likely to approve of a return to a voluntary and commercial system in which the market determines the mix of health care services and facilities. These data also reaffirm that the activist members are slightly more opposed to Medicare than the medical association executives, and that both these groups are more consistently opposed than the majority of physicians. P olitical Strategies. I f Canadian physicians are concerned with issues of professional control and dominance in the face of government intrustion in the health care field, what strategies are preferred as a means o f reinforcing the profession's position?
One strategy, part o f the history of government-profession relations in Canada, is the doctors' strike. Table 3 records that 60 percent of physicians disapprove and only one-quarter approve of " the withdrawal of nonemergency services" in support of income demands. While not necessarily an accurate indication o f the proportion of physicians who would or who actually take part in job action of this type, the result does measure widespread reluctance among Canadian physicians to leave their practices. This is true even in Ontario where 59 percent disapprove o f strike action in spite of-or perhaps because of-their recent experiences involving the withdrawal of services. Such reluctance may stem from a concern on the part of physicians for the welfare of their patients. It may also stem from the fact that physicians' strikes have proved to be more successful in mobilizing public opinion against the medical profession than in winning physicians' economic demands. Nevertheless, physicians in Saskatchewan, the site of the first doctors' strike in 1962, are more likely than those in other provinces to approve of strike action. A majority (51 percent) of physicians disapprove of the proposition that medical associations should be reconstituted " as labor unions under provincial labor law s." In comments attached to questionnaires, many respondents expressed discomfort both with strike action and unionization. Concerns include the undermining of medicine's prestige as an autonomous, self-governing profession, both from the public's viewpoint, and as a result of government's regulation of labor codes.
Another option, adopted in M anitoba, Saskatchewan, and Alberta, is binding arbitration in the event of deadlock with governments over fee negotiations. Physicians apparently believe in the legitimacy of their income expectations, a belief strengthened by the fact that arbitrated settlements have been favorable to the profession. Threequarters o f the survey respondents approve of arbitration, and only 11 percent explictly oppose it. In spite o f the Manitoba government's initial repudiation and attem pted roll-back of an arbitrated settlement in 1986, the eventual acceptance o f the award is likely a factor leading 81 percent o f M anitoba physicians to approve o f arbitration.
A number o f other related strategies have been publicly discussed. Special funds to " reward excellence in practice" were proposed by the government o f Ontario as a response to the profession's assertion that extra billing constituted a mechanism through which superior medical qualifications and experience were recognized. Sensing the potential dangers inherent in any program which would involve evaluating the credentials and performance of individual physicians, however, a gov ernment-established fund to reward excellence in practice was rejected by provincial medical association leaders. Our data show that almost equal proportions o f physicians nationally disapprove and approve of the establishment o f " special funds to reward excellence" ; an additional 22 percent are neutral. In Ontario, where the provincial association explicitly rejected the establishment of such funds, only 29 percent approve them.
Finally, 43 percent of respondents disapprove of " a salaried system for all physicians in hospital or group practice," including such benefits as pension and vacation and overtime payments, but 38 percent support this proposal. This distribution reflects the extent of debate within the profession over salaries that would provide practitioners stable incomes but also transform them from small entrepreneurs, to semiautonomous employees with lim ited economic discretion. A key issue, not specified in our question, is at what level salaries would be set.
Data from a recent survey show that, if assured that their incomes would remain unchanged (i.e ., not drop), close to two-thirds o f physicians in the province o f Quebec would accept salaries (Pineault, Contandriopolous, and Fournier 1985, 422) . As on other issues, therefore, there may be more flexibility within the profession on this basic question than is normally assumed.
Ideology a n d M e d ic a l P o litic s: T h e O ntario S trik e
Our discussion o f physicians' attitudes to questions raised in the political struggle over the Canada Health Act has suggested that the opinions o f most doctors are consistent with an underlying ideology of medical dominance and professional autonomy. In these terms, a majority of physicians defend professional autonomy in the determination of incomes, support various privatization policies, and agree that Medicare has resulted in a direct loss of physician control over medical decisions. The ideological solidarity of the profession is, however, far from complete. A majority of physicians oppose a return to commercial insurance; almost one-half favor some form o f centralized planning of health care services; and a majority agree that the effects of Medicare on health status have been positive despite perceptions of bureaucratic inefficiency.
There are, therefore, divisions within the medical profession over how to translate the general commitment to medical dominance and professional autonomy into appropriate public policy. These divisions relate both to political objectives and to political strategy. There is no overwhelming commitment to ''firee-market' rather than "socialized" medicine, and there is substantial resistance to the most militant forms of professional organization against contentious legislation. How, then, can these observations be reconciled with the public record of m ilitant professional opposition to the Canada Health Act?
The answer may be in the more extreme ideological orientations of the most active members o f the medical associations, who pressure the executive leadership into more hard-line positions than they might otherwise take. In order to test this hypothesis with more precision, we employed factor analysis to construct multiple-item scales tapping physicians' responses to questions o f health care policy (see appendix A for details), expecting to see a relation between professional association activism and ideological opposition to Medicare, particularly in Ontario where opposition to the Canada Health Act was most extreme. Table 4 records the relationship between these complex measures of ideological orientation and physicians' involvement in medical as sociations. The data to the left o f the table pertain to Canada as a whole and indicate that activist members of medical associations tend to be among the most strident critics o f public health insurance and the most com m itted to free-market medicine. For instance, the mean level of support among activist members for the principle of professional economic autonomy (3.7) is higher than that for executive leaders of the associations (3.6), for ordinary members (3.4), and for nonmembers (3.2). Similarly, activists score highest on the items measuring approval of the concept o f user pay and support for the privatization of health services, and they score lowest on the item measuring approval of Medicare in principle. Activist members also have distinct views regarding modes o f health delivery and the content of professional education.
Despite the consistency o f these differences at the national level, they are not marked. The modest nature o f the relation between ideology and medical association membership is measured by the magnitude of the eta coefficients: while the coefficients are statistically significant, they are small. The nation-wide results, then, are suggestive of, rather than conclusive evidence for, a situation in which a minority of ideologically committed activist members "pushes" association leaders and a passive rank and file into active opposition to government.
We get stronger support for our hypothesis in Ontario. The data to the right o f table 4 suggest, first of all, that Ontario physicians, as expected, are somewhat more critical of Medicare than are all physicians, and slightly more supportive o f economic autonomy, the principle of user pay, and privatization. More important, the eta coefficients indicate that the relation between association membership and ideology is much stronger in Ontario than it is nationally. For example, the eta coefficient summarizing the relation between medical association status and attitudes toward user pay rises from . 17 nationally to .27 in Ontario. activists indicating that they are not only more ideologically extreme but also more ideologically cohesive.
To demonstrate the political significance of the linkages between association activism and ideological orientations, we now examine their concrete expression in the choices o f Ontario physicians to participate or not in the 1986 strike.
Estimates of strike support are highly contentious. For instance, the Ontario Medical Association (OMA) claimed that 75 percent of doctors participated in the two-day strike called at the end o f May, while a newspaper poll put the figure at approximately 60 percent (Silversides, D ouglas, Ingram 1986) . Dr. Earl Myers, president of the OM A, predicted that the full strike would get more than 75 percent support, but newspaper polls indicated that not more than 50 percent o f physicians would strike on the day it was called, that 45 percent were on strike after one day, and that only 11 percent were on strike after a month (Toronto Globe a n d M a il 1986; Douglas and Balsara 1986; Kingwell and Masse 1986) . Our survey data, presented in table 5, indicate that 52 percent of Ontario physicians withdrew their services from the general public, while 46 percent withdrew services from their own patients, a t any time during 1986.
The data in table 5 reveal a marked correlation between strike participation and medical association involvement. O f executive members of the provincial association, close to 70 percent withdrew their services for some period. This proportion is predictably high, but indicates that the " nearly unanimous decision" of the OM A council may have been opposed by a significant group o f professional leaders pursuing a corporatist accommodation with government in the management of a publicly funded health care system. It is clear, secondly, that the nonexecutive but active members o f the association were even more strongly committed to strike action. I f they did not " push" their leadership along this path, the commitment to strike action by 80 percent o f active members may have encouraged the leadership to overestimate the strength of support among physicians in general, and to maintain a militant course o f action after it was perhaps politically unwise to have done so. This latter speculation is prompted, thirdly, by the evidence that only 47 percent o f the ordinary members and less than 20 percent of the nonmembers participated in the strike. One m ight argue that more may have supported the strike, although they were unable for one reason or another to participate. But this latter possibility seems unlikely given the data reported earlier to the effect that 59 percent o f Ontario physicians disapproved of strike action.
Consistent with our earlier arguments about the ideological grounding o f professional response to Medicare, the data in table 6 indicate that strikers in Ontario are an ideologically more homogeneous and politically right-wing group than nonstrikers. The standard deviations of their scores on the ideological variables are lower than those of nonstrikers and the mean values of those scores indicate significantly less support for Medicare in principle, or satisfaction with Medicare in practice, and significantly greater support for professional autonomy, user pay, and privatization in the funding o f the health care system. The results o f multivariate analysis, not shown, indicate that 21 percent of the observed variation in strike participation can be accounted for by scores on the first five o f the ideological variables in table 6. When medical association involvement is statistically controlled, these five ideological variables still account for 11 percent of the variance, indicating that, while correlated with medical association involvement, ideology has a unique, direct influence on strike participation in Ontario.
The extent to which professional ideology, organization, and political response are grounded in economic self-interest is demonstrated by patterns o f differences in the professional characteristics of strikers and nonstrikers in Ontario. On the one hand, the data in table 7 indicate that many o f the variables widely supposed to have affected strike participation did not in fiict do so. Sex and specialization, for example, have no measurable impact. Geographic location also played no significant role, even though a somewhat larger proportion o f physicians in 
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Toronto, as opposed to those elsewhere, participated in the strike. These data also show, however, that it was the most well-off who tended to support the strike: 62 percent o f those earning more than $ 131,000 participated, as compared to 4 l percent of those in the lowest income group. Physicians who had previously participated in extra billing were also much more likely than those who had never done so (77 versus 46 percent) to withdraw their services. The 25 percent of Ontario physicians with the largest patient loads, and correspondingly with the highest incomes, were much more likely to strike than those with the smallest loads (71 versus 31 percent); and 61 percent of physicians remunerated primarily through fee-for-service payment, as opposed to 13 percent of physicians who were primarily salaried, participated in the strike. These findings suggest that the Ontario strike was seen primarily as a means of securing the latitude available before the Canada Health Act for physicians autonomously to determine their incomes. Although the end of extra billing did nothing to interfere with clinical practice, it did constitute an affront to physicians, especially those w^ithin the most privileged strata of the profession, accustomed to manipulating the economic machinery of Medicare to their own best advantage. The Ontario case study, therefore, supports our argument that professional opposition to the Canada Health Act was based in an ideological defense o f professional dominance and autonomy, and that such opposition was "pushed'* by the ideologically more extreme minority o f activist members o f the OM A. It also supports the thesis that medical ideology and the defense o f professional autonomy are expressions o f the economic interests o f physicians. It is this fact that accounts for the contradictions inherent in the tendency of many physicians to seek, on the one hand, to lim it government control over health care insurance, while, on the other, calling for the extension o f government health care funding. Nevertheless, these contradictions, while perhaps consistent with the logic of self-interest, must ultimately create confusion within the profession about the extent to which it should attem pt to enter into accommodations with governments over the operations o f Canadian Medicare.
D iscussion a n d C onclusions
In this article we suggest some new lines of interpretation and speculation about medical politics in the wake o f the Canada Health Act. Our analysis of the attitudes of practicing physicians indicates that opposition to Medicare by the organized medical profession is characterized by a paradoxical strength and weakness. This paradox is apparent in each of the dimensions o f the conflict surrounding the recent legislation that we have considered: attitudes toward Medicare in principle; attitudes toward the reprivatization o f funding for physician and other medical services; and attitudes toward political strategies available for the pursuit o f professional interests.
The paradox is rooted in the coexistence of a widespread ideological commitment to professional autonomy and dominance coupled with internally contradictory or at least divided attitudes toward the proper ways of regulating and financing health care services, and protecting professional dominance. Our data show that physicians react negatively to the perceived threat to their autonomy posed by government health insurance; that there is widespread agreement among physicians that they have experienced a loss of autonomy and economic status as a result of Medicare; and that physicians are reluctant to attribute to Medicare any improvements in the quality of health services while arguing that extra billing and hospital user fees should not have been eliminated as a result o f the Canada Health Act. At the same time, however, about one-half o f physicians accept the need for a nationally regulated health care system, oppose the return of the current system to voluntary and commercial control, and report fundamental satisfaction with their personal experience in practice under medicare. Ideological militance in defence o f professional autonomy on issues like extra billing is not duplicated in support for militant strategies such as a strike.
All ideologies, however, adm it a large measure of vagueness and inconsistency, and it cannot be assumed that the lack of universal agreement on all issues, or perfect consistency in the structure of medical ideology, weakens its uses in defending medical dominance against the interventions o f public authorities. There are, however, a number o f potential weaknesses in the medical profession's capacity for political organization.
N o more than one-fourth o f the profession is consistently committed ideologically to opposition to a government health insurance system, and about the same proportion are consistently ideologically committed to its support. Between these polarized positions lies the majority, who should not be considered a priori to be more amenable to the influence o f their colleagues who strongly oppose Medicare in future debates over health care policy, even though the majority position is grounded ideologically in defense of medical dominance of the health care system. "Moderates'* among leaders of the profession and government may so far have overestimated the homogeneity o f professional opinion and the influence of those ideologically most opposed to Medicare, failing as a result to articulate a defense o f the system that is convincing to the majority of the ideologically less-rigid members of the profession.
Our analysis of provincial differences in physician attitudes suggests also that direct confrontation by government with the profession does not strengthen the solidarity of the profession in its opposition to Medicare. In the most extreme case of confrontation between government and profession over the implementation of the Canada Health Act, the doctors' strike in Ontario, it does not appear that professional opposition to Medicare was raised above the norm for the rest of Canada. Ontario physicians are, if anything, somewhat more supportive of the principles of Medicare, and somewhat less supportive of the merits o f the most militant forms of professional opposition to gov ernment than their colleagues in provinces that have taken a much less confrontational position vis-a-vis government.
The pattern o f East-W est regional variation in physician attitudes suggests that physicians reflect the political culture in the provinces where they are located. Public opinion and professional attitudes in Quebec and the M aritimes are somewhat more supportive of social welfare policy and Medicare than is the case in the West. Given the depth o f public support for Medicare in Canada, this suggests that professional resistance to future government initiatives that maintain or increase public financing and regulation of the system may be considerably less effective than has been supposed, depending upon the care and skill with which governments articulate the justification for such initiatives and mobilize public support for them.
This last comment is connected to our discussion of the interest group politics o f the medical associations. Traditions of solo practice and professional independence, as well as relatively high work loads and a more narrow range of social interaction on the job as compared with other professions are likely to lim it the political information and activism o f physicians. Oligarchic leadership and appeals to ideological solidarity may tend, therefore, to dominate the internal politics of the professional associations. Our analysis has suggested that the relatively narrow circles o f activist participation in these associations include leaders and active members who are significantly more ideologically opposed to Medicare and more m ilitant in defense of professional autonomy than the majority of members of the profession.
These observations further illustrate the political weaknesses of the profession. Though it is unlikely that the less active and more moderate members will organize to elect less m ilitant leaders, the lim its to which the associations can respond primarily to militant minorities of their membership are particularly evident in the minority approval o f strike action. Such lim its may become even more apparent as the agenda for health policy debate shifts from problems of accessibility (and the associated questions o f extra billing and user fees) to the much more intractable issues o f cost effectiveness and quality. The issues o f accessibility addressed by the Canada Health Act directly confronted the symbolic cornerstone of the doctrine of medical autonomy (control over income), and gave maximum scope to the associations' mobilization o f professional solidarity. The issues of cost effectiveness and quality have the potential o f stim ulating greater internal division within the profession, according to experience, proficiency, and styles of practice. Under such circumstances, the associations would have greater difficulty prom oting the interests of the ideologically militant defenders of medical dominance.
While public authorities may be encouraged by these findings to undertake further policy changes opposed by the professional associations, our purpose has been to suggest that it is politically possible, as well as desirable, to develop initiatives that move beyond the confrontation between professional control over the delivery of health care and public control over financing, to "develop and expand avenues of communication between political and professional authorities, on the understanding that neither one is going to, or should, go away" (Evans 1984, 3 4 7 -48) . Our analysis suggests that medicine is not monolithic, and that there are political grounds for expecting that such change can be undertaken without escalating conflict and confrontation. The challenge will be to establish an agenda and lines of communication that break out of the institutionalized conflict that has characterized the relations between governments and organized medicine thus far.
Appendix A: Multiple-item Variable Construction
The m ultiple-item variables used in this article were constructed by first selecting groups of related questionnaire items in relevant areas and then confirming their unidimensionality by use o f factor analysis. Groups of items were considered to comprise acceptable variables if variance estimates for the first principal components exceeded 50 percent. In some cases the response scales were reversed so as to be consistent with the " direction" of other items. Variable scores were computed by simply summing and averaging the values of the component items. The consensus in the methodological literature is that unless component items differ appreciably in variance, the simple sum ap proximates the reliability of a score computed using factor weights. These simple scores have the advantage of greater intelligibility since the original response scales can be conserved, and they are considerably easier to compute. Presented below are the exact wordings of the questionnaire items used to construct the multiple-item variables. 
